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Abstract
I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out
my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic
Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer
four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory
is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I
argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The
Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the
past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those
who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible:
What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking
about traveling back in time? For it certainly does not feel like we are
thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible.
Keywords
Time travel, Dynamic Theory of Time, Static Theory of Time, backward
causation, presentism.

1 Introduction
Most people will tell you that the inexorable passage of time is a
real thing, and (for better or worse) one of the more salient aspects
of reality.1 For most people endorse what is sometimes called The
Dynamic Theory of Time, according to which time really passes,
and there are fundamental differences between the past, the present,
and the future. But most people also love a good time travel story,
1

By ‘most people’ I do not mean most philosophers but, rather, most people
in general.
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and would probably jump at the chance to travel back in time (either
going back and merely blending in, so that nothing changes, or else
going back and changing the past), if only they could.
All of this is a problem, I will argue, because The Dynamic Theory of Time entails that time travel to the past is not merely difficult,
or prohibitively expensive, but downright metaphysically impossible.
If The Dynamic Theory is true, as most people believe, then it is not
possible to travel back in time. Not only that but, as I will further argue, even if I happen to be wrong about The Dynamic Theory entailing the metaphysical impossibility of time travel to the past, it will
still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that we should not want
to travel back to the past. So most people want to do a thing that they
should not want to do (given what they believe about time), and that
is in fact not even possible (again given what they believe about time).
Or so I will argue in this paper. Then I will address a further
puzzle that arises from the thesis that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: Many of our favorite stories involve time travel
to the past, but do not have the distinctive feel of a story based on a
metaphysically impossible premise. This raises a question concerning what we are thinking about when we consider time travel stories.
In the last section of the paper I will try to resolve this puzzle in a
way that is consistent with my thesis that time travel to the past is
metaphysically impossible.
But before I get to all of that, I want to start by offering a new way
of capturing the distinction between The Dynamic Theory of Time
and its rival, The Static Theory of Time.

2 Two theories about the nature of time
The guiding thought behind The Static Theory of Time is that
time is similar to space.2 Some people think this follows from The
2
The degree to which time is thought to be similar to the dimensions of space
will vary from one Static Theorist to another. For example, some Static Theorists
may want to take the asymmetry in what is allowed along time-like dimensions by
special relativity (or some other physical theory) to be an intrinsic feature of time
itself, rather than merely a contingent fact about the spread of physical phenomena in the actual universe. And such people will want to say that time is different
in at least some important respects from the other dimensions of the spacetime
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Special Theory of Relativity, but in my view that is a mistake. The
idea that time is like space is certainly an interesting—and even
compelling—way to think about time, but it is not forced upon
us by The Special Theory of Relativity, or indeed by any other
empirical theory.3
Here is some terminology that will be useful in stating both The
Static Theory and The Dynamic Theory.4
A-properties: putative temporal properties such as being present,
being past, being future, being four days future, etc.
B-relations: temporal relations such as simultaneous with, earlier
than, later than, four days later than, etc.
And here are six ways in which time is supposed to be like space,
on The Static Theory of Time.5 (It is worth emphasizing that the
different components I am building into The Static Theory need
not all be combined in this way. There are various “mix and match”
combinations that have been endorsed in print. But the combination
presented here is probably the most popular in the literature, and
arguably the most interesting. It is also worth emphasizing that, since
all of the arguments below are concerned with what is entailed by
The Dynamic Theory of Time, rather than The Static Theory, nothing in what follows turns on the choice of a specific version of The
Static Theory.)

manifold. But all Static Theorists will agree that time is in some significant ways
similar to the dimensions of space.
3

This point has been made before. See for example Emery 2019, Hinchliff
2000, Miller 2004, Markosian 2004: Section 3.9, and Zimmerman 2008: 218–21.
4

The terms ‘A-property’ and ‘B-relation’ are first used together in Markosian
1993, but they derive from McTaggart’s talk of an A-series and a B-series. See
McTaggart 1908.
5

Some or all of the following components of The Static Theory can be found
in Williams 1951, Price 1977, Smart 1966, Lewis 1976, Sider 2001, Hawley
2001, and Moss 2012. (As well as many other places.) Much more could be said
about each of the components of the theory. But then this paper would be a book.
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The Static Theory of Time
1. The universe is spread out in four dimensions (each one orthogonal to each other one), which together make up a unified,
four-dimensional manifold (appropriately called spacetime) in
which physical objects are located and possibly extended.
2. Any physical object that persists through time does so in virtue
of having a temporal part at each moment at which it is present.
3. There are no genuine and irreducible A-properties; all talk
that appears to be about A-properties can be correctly analyzed in terms of B-relations.
4. The temporal facts about the world include facts about B-relations, but they do not include any facts about A-properties.
5. We do not need to take tense seriously. Propositions have truth
values simpliciter rather than at times, and so cannot change
their truth values over time. Also, we can in principle eliminate
verbal tenses like is, was, and will be from an ideal language.
6. The correct ontology does not change over time, and it always includes objects from every region of spacetime.
Static Theorists admit that time seems special to us, and that in fact
time appears to have a dynamic aspect that makes it different from
space. But they insist that this is just a subjective feature of consciousness—of how we experience the world—and not an objective
feature of reality that is independent of us.6
For The Dynamic Theory of Time, on the other hand, the guiding thought is that time is very different from space, in a number of
ways. Opponents of The Dynamic Theory (and sometimes proponents as well) like to characterize the theory using the metaphor of a
moving spotlight that slides along the temporal dimension, brightly
illuminating just one moment of time, the present, while the future
is a kind of foggy region of potential and the past is a shadowy realm
6

See for example Paul 2010.
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of what has been. But it is important to understand that while the
moving spotlight is an intuitively appealing way to capture the idea
behind The Dynamic Theory, in the end it is just a metaphor. What
the metaphor represents is the essential idea behind The Dynamic Theory, namely, the idea that being future, being present, and being
past are objective and metaphysically significant properties of times,
events, and things. Also, the metaphor of the moving spotlight represents the fact that according to The Dynamic Theory, each time
undergoes a somewhat peculiar but inexorable process, sometimes
called temporal becoming. It goes from being in the distant future to
being in the near future, it has a brief moment of glory in the present,
and then it recedes forever further and further into the past.
Despite its being intuitively appealing (especially for Static Theorists, who see it as a caricature of The Dynamic Theory), the moving spotlight metaphor has a major drawback: It encourages us to
think of time as a fourth dimension, akin to the dimensions of space.
But for The Dynamic Theory, as I am understanding it, this way of
thinking—“spatializing time”—is a major no-no. On The Dynamic
Theory, it is not that there are these four similar but orthogonal dimensions, which together make up a unified manifold, and one of
which just happens to have some extra bells and whistles (like a moving spotlight) added to it. Instead, it is that time is completely different from the dimensions of space. So different, in fact, that it is a
completely different kind of dimension. For time (on The Dynamic
Theory) is more similar to modality or morality than to space: we
can call it a dimension, but it would be a mistake to think of it as one
of several similar dimensions that together make up a unified manifold that contains the physical universe.7
Here is the view.8 (Important note: the different components I
am building into The Dynamic Theory need not all be combined
in this way. There are various “mix and match” combinations that
are possible (some of which have been explicitly endorsed). But this
7
For a recent argument against the claim that time and space form a unified
manifold of orthogonal dimensions, see Markosian 2020.
8
Some or all of the following components of The Dynamic Theory can be
found in Prior 1967, Thomson 1983, Markosian 1993 and 2004, and Sullivan
2012. (Not to mention many other places.)
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particular combination is among the most popular in the literature,
and is arguably the most interesting. In any case it is the combination
that I endorse, and the one that I will be discussing in this paper.)
The Dynamic Theory of Time
1. Time cannot be added to the dimensions of space to form a
unified manifold in which physical objects are located and
possibly extended.
2. Any physical object that persists through time does so in virtue
of being wholly present at each moment at which it is present.9
3. There are genuine and irreducible A-properties, which cannot
be correctly analyzed in terms of B-relations.
4. The temporal facts about the world include ever-changing
facts involving A-properties, including facts about which times
are past, which time is present, and which times are future.
5. We must take tense seriously. Propositions have truth values
at times rather than simpliciter and can, in principle, change
their truth values over time. Also, we cannot eliminate verbal tenses like is, was, and will be from an ideal language.
6. The correct ontology is liable to change over time, and it is
always true that only present objects exist.
I want to offer two better metaphors for capturing our two theories
of time. For The Static Theory, the universe is like a movie that is
never shown. The frames are all there, but the movie is just sitting
on a shelf. Also, instead of being attached end to end, in the normal
way of filmstrips, the frames are cut, and then stacked one on top
of another (in chronological order). Each frame is a temporal slice
of the world, and if you look closely at the stack of frames, you can
see the various objects—each of which is a “spacetime worm”—
curving through the continuum that is spacetime. (It helps if you
turn the stack sideways, so that earlier frames are to the left of later
9

For a definition of ‘wholly present’ see Markosian 1994: 248.
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frames.) Importantly, on The Static Theory, because the movie is
never shown, no part of it is metaphysically privileged. There is no
light shining on any one frame. No frame is special.
For The Dynamic Theory, on the other hand, the universe is like
a movie that is being shown in a theater right now. And, crucially, it’s
not the frames in the filmstrip that are the universe: it is the image
on the screen. There is only one image on the screen, and it keeps
changing. That’s because reality is one thing that keeps changing. It
was that way, and now it is this way. Soon it will be some other way.
The frames in the filmstrip up in the projection booth are a useful way to represent the different states of the universe at different
times, on The Dynamic Theory. They are like maximal, consistent,
tensed propositions. There is always one of them that is special: the
one that corresponds to the image on the screen right now. But it is
important to understand that which frames are in the filmstrip, and
which one has a light shining through it right now, is determined by
the universe, and not the other way around. (So this is an important
disanalogy between the universe and a movie being shown in a theater, on The Dynamic Theory.)
This pair of movie theater metaphors to capture the two theories
of time is essential to my preferred way of thinking about The Dynamic Theory and its rival, The Static Theory; and the metaphors
will play an important role in the arguments below. But before I
get to the problems with The Dynamic Theory and time travel to
the past, let me first say something about time travel on The Static
Theory of Time.

3 Time travel and the static theory of time
The Static Theory is normally thought of as being consistent with
the possibility of traveling in time, and indeed Static Theorists love
to theorize about time travel.10 The key, for Static Theorists, is that
a time traveler is defined as someone whose personal time disagrees
with external time.11 External time is the normal, objective, temporal
10

See for example Lewis 1976, Vihvelin 1996, Sider 2002, Dyke 2005, Miller
2017 and Bernstein 2015.
11

This definition of time travel and the following definitions of ‘personal
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order experienced by non-time-travelers everywhere. Your personal
time, on the other hand, is the series of times that results from ordering the events in your life according to standard causal patterns,
so that eating precedes digestion, and so on. If you eat a sandwich
before getting into your time machine in 2020, and then digest that
sandwich after your arrival back in 1920, then your personal time
is ordered accordingly. And, in that case, since your personal time
would disagree with external time, you would be a time traveler.
But what makes it true that that person popping into existence in
1920 with the sandwich in her stomach is you, according to the Static
Theorist? The answer is that it’s a little bit complicated. Here is a short
version of the account favored by David Lewis and many other Static
Theorists. We start with facts about all of the qualities distributed
over spacetime. Next we identify the most basic patterns displayed by
the distribution of these qualities. These most basic patterns are the
laws of nature. Then we use the laws to determine which events are
causing which events, and which temporal parts are related to which
other temporal parts by the different temporal parts of the same object
relation. Once these facts are fixed, we get facts like the fact that that
person stage in the time machine in 1920 is a part of the same person
as this other person stage in the time machine in 2020. And finally,
we order all of the person stages of one person according to the standard causal patterns—with eating preceding digestion—in order to
get each person’s personal time. So on The Static Theory, as long as
we have the right person stages with the right properties at the right
times, so that we have some people whose personal times disagree
with external time, there can be time travelers.
One possible response to this line of reasoning from the Static
Theorist is, “That all sounds great, although there remains a troubling
question: Why do we not see time travelers from the future? They
would after all be easy to recognize, because they would all wear the
same monochromatic outfits. And yet we do not see this. Strange!”12
time’ and ‘external time’ are from Lewis 1976: 146.
12

For the record, I do not endorse the argument suggested here. I think our
failure to spot time travelers from the future is at best a small piece of defeasible
evidence against the possibility of time travel to the past. But there are other possible explanations for our not seeing time travelers from the future. Perhaps they
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I think the explanation for this apparent mystery is that The Dynamic Theory of Time is true, and also that The Dynamic Theory is
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. In the next
four sections I will explain why.

4 The rubber duck argument
The first reason why The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the
possibility of time travel to the past is that if The Dynamic Theory is
true, then personal time is a rubber duck—it sounds like it is a type
of time, but it’s really not. Here is why this is relevant. The Static
Theorist is correct to say that someone’s adventures should count as
traveling in time only if her personal time disagrees with external
time. But an important corollary of this conception of time travel
is that time travel is possible only if personal time is sufficiently like
external time to deserve the name time. And if The Dynamic Theory
is true, then personal time is not sufficiently like external time to
deserve the name time. For personal time lacks pizzazz. The reason personal time lacks pizzazz is that there is no equivalent of the
(metaphorical) moving spotlight for personal time. That is, there is
no special property of presentness that is instantiated by one special
time, and then instantiated by another time, and so on. Without that
feature, personal time, on The Dynamic Theory, is just an alternative way of lining up the events in someone’s life; but it does not give
us something that is sufficiently like time to deserve the name time.
Here is an example to illustrate my point. Suppose you are playing
a game. The game is made up of a series of discrete moves, each of
which starts from the same position. There are 26 types of move—
A-type moves, B-type moves, etc.—with a billion instances of each
type. Normally people playing the game first perform an A-type
move, then a B-type move, etc. But that is not required by the rules.
So you perform a series of moves in the game. It’s a series that, given
the way people normally play this game, looks quite bizarre. You first
perform a J-type move, followed by an S-type move, and then an
A-type move, etc. Also, in addition to looking bizarre, your series
don’t choose to visit our troubled era, with its widespread injustice. Or perhaps
they do, but are careful to blend in.
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of moves in the game constitutes a poor effort, worthy of a very low
score in the game. But suppose it just so happens that if your moves are
re-ordered in the normal way, like a video being re-spliced, so that your
A-type move comes first, and is followed by your B-type move, which
is followed by your C-type move, etc., then your series of moves constitutes the most brilliant and high-scoring game ever played.
Does the fact that when your moves are re-ordered in this way
they disagree with their ordering in external time mean that you are
a time traveler (who has in fact played the most brilliant game of this
kind ever)? I don’t think so. I think it just means that the series of
moves that you actually performed has a peculiar feature. It is a series
that looks weird, but can be made to look normal by re-splicing. And
the reason you are not a time traveler, despite the fact that your series of moves has this strange feature, is that there is nothing special
about the particular way of re-ordering your moves that makes them
look like a brilliant playing of the game. It is not a metaphysically
privileged way of ordering the relevant events—it is just one of many
possible ways that those events could be ordered.
We might say that that way of ordering your moves in the game
corresponds to your “standard-game time” (by analogy with personal
time), but it doesn’t follow that there is anything metaphysically significant about that way of ordering the events. Nor does it follow that
there is a special kind of time associated with that way of ordering
your moves.
I think it’s the same with personal time. We can re-order the
events of the time traveler’s life according to commonly seen patterns
for those events, and it is remarkable that when we do so, we get an
ordering that differs from the ordering of those events in external
time. But it doesn’t follow that there is a special kind of time associated with the relevant ordering of the events of the time traveler’s life.
You might wonder what would make some particular way of ordering a series of events sufficiently like external time. Easy: there would
have to be something equivalent to a moving spotlight that follows that
particular way of ordering those events. That is, there would have to
be a “moving flashlight” for the time traveler’s personal time. It would
start at her birth, and move up to the moment when she pushes the
button in the time machine. Then it would jump back to the much
earlier arrival in the time machine. And this moving flashlight would
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represent a metaphysically signiicant, temporal property, just like presentness, that moves across the events of the time traveler’s life, but in a
way that is out of sync with the grand moving spotlight.
But of course there is no such moving flashlight, because there
is no metaphysically signiicant, temporal property that moves across the
events of the time traveler’s life in a way that is out of sync with the
grand moving spotlight. The Dynamic Theory entails that there is a
dynamic aspect to external time, but it does not entail that there is
an additional dynamic aspect to each individual’s personal time. Nor
is it in any way plausible to posit such a dynamic aspect to anyone’s
personal time, as a metaphysical add-on to the Dynamic Theory.
Which is why personal time is a rubber duck—it’s called “time” but
it’s not really time.
Here is my argument.13
The Rubber Duck Argument
(1) If time travel is possible, then whether you are a time traveler
depends on whether your personal time disagrees with external time.
(2) If whether you are a time traveler depends on whether your
personal time disagrees with external time, then personal
time must be sufficiently like external time to deserve the
name time.
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that personal time is not sufficiently like external time to deserve the name time.14
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel is not possible.
13

Theodore Sider offers a broadly similar argument, but one that differs in
certain details, in Sider 2005.
14

John W. Carroll has suggested in correspondence that there may be a similar issue for The Static Theory of Time, which would mean that it too is incompatible with the possibility of time travel. I am sympathetic to this suggestion, but
will not explore it here, since my aim in this paper is merely to argue that The
Dynamic Theory, at least, entails the impossibility of time travel.
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(I note that this argument works equally well against the possibility
of time travel to the future.)
There is a natural objection to this argument that will have occurred to some readers. The objection begins by pointing out that it
is the causal relations among the events of the time traveler’s life that
generate the ordering of those events in the time traveler’s personal
time. For example, the time traveler’s eating a sandwich right before
pushing a button and then disappearing in 2020 causes the digesting
events in the time traveler’s stomach in 1920; and this is precisely why
the eating event precedes the digesting event in her personal time.
So far, so good. The next part of the natural objection involves
the thought that ordering a series of events (like those of the time
traveler’s life) according to the causal relations among those events is
in no way arbitrary, and in fact gives us a very time-like ordering, insofar as the notions of causation and time have long been thought to be
inextricably linked.15 Thus, according to the objection, personal time
is, after all, sufficiently like external time to deserve the name time.
My reply to this objection is that it works only if we assume The
Static Theory of Time. For on The Dynamic Theory, there are important facts about time that are not captured merely by the fact that
moments of time (and events in time) are ordered in a certain way. It
is also essential to time—and hence to being sufficiently like time—
that there is a dynamic aspect to the temporal dimension. This is
what is captured by the moving spotlight metaphor, and it is what is
captured in a non-metaphorical way by the claim that there are genuine and irreducible facts about A-properties, which keep changing in
an inexorable way, no matter what anyone does. And this is why we
would have to make the absurd posit of a moving flashlight for the
time traveler’s personal time in order for personal time to be sufficiently like external time. Without a moving flashlight—without a
special property that attaches to the moments of personal time, in a
way that keeps changing inexorably—personal time remains just an
interesting, alternative way of ordering a bunch of events.

15
The so-called causal theory of time has a long history. See for example
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Book II, Chapter 2, Section
3B; Reichenbach 1956: 32–42, and Mellor 1998: Chapter 10.
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5 No backward causation
The second reason why The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with
the possibility of time travel to the past has to do with backward causation. To be a real time traveler, who travels, say, from 2020 back
to 1920, your pushing the button in your time machine in 2020 must
cause your appearance in 1920. Without that detail, it is not a story
about time travel. But The Dynamic Theory entails that this kind
of backward causation is impossible. That is, The Dynamic Theory
entails the following thesis.
No Backward causatioN: Causes can never occur after their effects.
And here is why The Dynamic Theory entails No Backward causatioN.
To cause some event is to make it happen. But The Dynamic Theory
entails that there is a crucial distinction between an event’s going to
happen, its happening, and its having happened. This is part of the Dynamic Theorist’s claim that we must take tense seriously (a.k.a. the
fifth component of The Dynamic Theory), and it is a result of the real
and objective distinctions made by the theory between past, present,
and future (in the third and fourth components of the theory).
On The Static Theory, of course, there are no such distinctions.
All the events are there, in a four-dimensional spread. Each event
stands in various B-relations to other events. And that is all there is
to time. Meanwhile, since, according to The Static Theory, the facts
about causation are a function of the pattern of distribution of qualities over spacetime, it turns out that there are no a priori rules about
how causation can work. This is why The Static Theory is consistent
with backward causation.
But on The Dynamic Theory, there is a great deal more to time.
One way to see this is in terms of the movie metaphor. Think of the
universe as a changing image on a movie screen. Let there be a scene
in the movie that is the appearance (seemingly from nowhere) in
1920 of a woman in a time machine. And let this scene be followed
immediately by scenes of this woman’s having various adventures,
until eventually she dies of old age in 1980. (It’s a really long movie.)
Let there also be a scene in 1990 that is the birth of a baby girl,
which scene is followed in the movie by her growing up, building a
time machine, getting into the machine in 2020, setting the dials for
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1920, and then disappearing. And, finally, let the woman who disappears in 2020 be just like the woman who appears in 1920. (Similarly
with the time machine in 2020 and the one in 1920.)
Now suppose we are watching the movie, and are right at the moment featuring the woman in the time machine in 2020. Suppose we
see her, up on the screen, reaching for the button. And ask yourself
whether this imminent event—her pushing the button—is going
to cause that earlier event—the appearing from nowhere event in
1920, the one involving a woman just like her. Given that the appearing from nowhere event of 1920 already happened in the movie many
years ago, it seems like the answer must be, No, this woman’s pushing
the button now cannot possibly make that earlier event happen, because the
earlier event was part of a scene that has already happened. It’s past.
Notice that even without the movie metaphor, it remains true
(according to The Dynamic Theory) that there is a fundamental,
unanalyzable difference between some event e’s going to happen, e’s
happening, and e’s having happened. And this difference is the crucial
difference between what is future, what is present, and what is past.
On The Dynamic Theory, there are real, objective facts about these
matters. There is a genuine and metaphysically significant difference
between past, present, and future. And a crucial consequence of this
distinction is that once an event has happened, it is too late to make it
happen. The past is over.
So the American writer William Faulkner had it completely
wrong when he wrote “The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.”16
This is a beautiful way to capture The Static Theory of Time—but
if The Static Theory is false, as I believe it is, then this is a beautiful
way to capture a deeply mistaken idea about time.17 Meanwhile, the
Irish folk singer Phil Coulter was on the right track when he wrote
“For what’s done is done and what’s won is won, And what’s lost is
lost and gone forever.”18 These are beautiful words, too, even though
16

Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, p. 73.

17
Also, to be fair to Faulkner, this idea is probably not what he actually had
in mind when he wrote this line. I suspect that what he actually had in mind is
something that is consistent with The Dynamic Theory, namely, the idea that
traces of past events are always with us.
18

Coulter, The Town I Loved So Well, 1973.
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the idea they express is a metaphysically significant but deeply sad
fact about reality.
Here is what I take to be the upshot of these remarks: Reality
is tensed. There is only one image—the one on the screen—and
it keeps changing. But once an event has happened, and is in the
past—once a scene has appeared on the screen—it is thereafter too
late to make it happen. That would be like trying to create a thing—
a building, say—that already exists. For once a building exists, it is
too late to bring it into existence. The argument can be formulated
as follows.
The No Backward causatioN Argument
(1) To cause an event is to make it happen.
(2) The Dynamic Theory entails that once an event has happened, it is too late to make it happen.
�
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that backward causation is not
possible.
(4) Time travel to the past is possible only if backward causation
is possible.
�
(5) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel to the past is
not possible.
Here is a likely objection: This means that The Dynamic Theory is
incompatible with certain theories of causation (like Counterfactual
Dependence) and certain general pictures of how causation works
(like the Lewisean “Humean Supervenience” picture), which allow
for the possibility of backward causation.19
My reply is that I plead guilty. The Dynamic Theory does entail
the substantive claim that there is more to causation than counterfactual dependence. For counterfactual dependence can hold between
19

On Counterfactual Dependence see Lewis 1973. On Humean Supervenience
see Lewis 1994.
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an event and a later event, and The Dynamic Theory entails No Backward causatioN. (Similarly with The Dynamic Theory and the general
Humean Supervenience picture.)
Mind you, it’s not that there aren’t any possible worlds like the
ones envisioned by the Static Theorist with a Lewisean account of
time travel. It’s just that those are not genuine time travel worlds.
For consider one of those worlds. Let it be an ideal scenario for the
Static Theorist. A person in a strange machine pops into existence,
seemingly from nowhere, in 1920, with lots of memory impressions
that seem to be from 2020 of building a time machine, setting the
dials for 1920, and pushing the button. That person lives out her days
in the 20th Century, and then dies. Later, a girl is born, grows up,
and in 2020 builds what looks like a time machine. She sets the dials
for 1920. And as she pushes the button, she happens to be just like
the woman who popped into existence back in 1920. Then she and
her machine disappear.
This is a world with some amazing happenings and coincidences.
It’s an amazing happening that this woman and her machine popped
into existence when they did, out of nowhere, in 1920. It’s an amazing coincidence that the later woman with the alleged time machine
in 2020 ended up being just like the miracle woman who popped up
in 1920. And it’s an even more amazing coincidence that, right when
the later woman with the alleged time machine came to be qualitatively identical to the woman who popped into existence in 1920,
she (the later woman) suddenly popped out of existence!
But this is not a time travel world (on The Dynamic Theory),
because the woman’s pushing the button in 2020 did not cause the
appearance of the woman and the machine in 1920. This is guaranteed to be true (again assuming The Dynamic Theory) because of No
Backward causatioN.

6 Only one next
My third reason for thinking that The Dynamic Theory of Time is
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past is that there
is only one next. The idea behind this argument is similar to that
behind The Rubber Duck Argument, but it is more of a big picture
point. One way to make the point is in terms of the movie metaphor.
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Imagine that we are watching the movie, and that it depicts what
counts as an ideal time travel scenario, according to The Static Theorist. First we saw an apparent time traveler popping into existence.
Then we saw her living out her days in a constant state of amazement
over how old-timey everything was. How fun that was for her! Then
we watched her dying of old age, in 1980. After that we saw a girl
being born in 1990. Then we watched the girl growing up and building a time machine. And now we see her getting into the machine
and reaching for the button. What will happen next? Will she travel
back in time? Will she next exist in 1920?
The answer is No. Many people existed in 1920, including the apparent time traveler, who looked just like this woman on the screen
now. (Remember when we saw that woman back there, right here
on this screen? How exciting that was!) But what will happen next
is that the movie will continue with the current scene, the way it
always and inexorably does. What will happen next with respect to
the would-be time traveler on the screen right now is that she and
her misleadingly labeled “time machine” will disappear, never to be
seen again. Unlucky! What will definitely not happen next is that the
image on the screen will shift back to 1920 so the would-be time
traveler can experience all of that. For (and here is the crucial point)
the universe is a movie without lashbacks. It is a movie in which the story
always progresses forward in time. So if the current image on the
screen is of a woman in a machine about to push a button, and if the
next image will show that the woman and the machine have disappeared, then what will happen next is that she will be gone. Even if
there was an earlier scene in which someone like her in a machine
like that popped into existence seemingly from nowhere, that does
not make it true that what will happen next (in the image on the
screen, which is the one and only reality) is that earlier scene. So
what will happen next is that the other people on the screen will be
standing around saying, “I wonder what happened to her!”
The upshot of these considerations is that it is not possible for
her to go back to 1920. She, like the rest of us, can only go forward.
Here is the argument.
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The “Only One Next” Argument
(1) If someone is about to travel back in time, then it must be
true (in some important sense) that what she will experience
next is an event in the past.
(2) The Dynamic Theory entails that it is never true (in any important sense) that what someone will experience next is an
event in the past.
�
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel to the past is
not possible.
It might be objected that there is an important sense in which what
will happen next is that the woman who is about to push the button
will experience popping into existence, seemingly from nowhere,
back in 1920. For that is what will happen next in her personal time.
This would be a good objection if The Static Theory were true. But
we are now supposing that The Dynamic Theory is true, which
means that there is only one reality (namely, the changing image on
the screen). And it is because of this crucial fact that there is only
one important sense of next, namely, what will happen next in the
one and only reality.

7 Other times are not possible destinations
My fourth reason for thinking that The Dynamic Theory of Time is
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past, unlike the
previous three reasons, depends crucially on the fact that I have built
Presentism into my characterization of The Dynamic Theory (as
the sixth tenet of the theory). Since some philosophers who endorse
the other five tenets of The Dynamic Theory do not also endorse
Presentism, this is worth flagging at the outset. (So please consider
there to be a warning flag placed right here.)
We have seen that the reason The Static Theory is so amenable
to the idea of time travel is that it spatializes time—it makes time
one of four more or less similar dimensions in which the physical
universe is spread out. This means that, setting aside problems about
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whether the laws of nature permit this, it is theoretically possible
for an object like you or me to move around in the four-dimensional
manifold in a way that satisfies Lewis’s definition of time travel. For
we are, on this view, just a bunch of people sitting around in a fourdimensional manifold, and we can therefore think about getting up
and moving to a different location in the manifold.
But of course on The Dynamic Theory, other times are not locations in a manifold. You might therefore wonder: What are other times,
on The Dynamic Theory, if they are not locations in a manifold? This is an
important question, and there are many different possible answers
available to the Dynamic Theorist. A proper treatment of the issue
would be beyond the scope of this paper, but in what follows I will
summarize my favorite answer to this question. I take it to be a fairly
representative account of other times, according to The Dynamic
Theory, and I think that alternative Dynamic Theory accounts of
other times would give rise to the same argument against time travel
that I am going to give in this section, but I will not pursue that
question here. So please consider the argument of this section to be
more conditional than the previous arguments I have given: for it is
conditional on including Presentism in The Dynamic Theory, and
also on one particular way of accounting for other times, given the
constraints of Presentism.
Recall that on The Dynamic Theory, time is more like modality
than it is like space. And notice that modality is not a dimension in
the manifold that houses our physical universe. Modality is a way of
talking about how things might have been. Other possible worlds are
best thought of as maximal, consistent ways things could be. They
are enormous propositions.20
w is a possible world =df w is a maximal, consistent proposition.
Likewise, time is a way of talking about how things have been and
will be. (‘I reached home at noon yesterday’ is a way of saying that
x number of hours ago I reached home.) So times, on the view that
I like, are best thought of as maximal, consistent, present-tensed
20
This is one of several standard conceptions of possible worlds for those who
do not accept David Lewis’s modal realism. See Plantinga 1974, Prior and Fine
1977, Lewis 1986 and Menzel 2018 for some discussion of similar views.
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propositions. But they are the ones that have been true, are true, or will
be true.
t is a time =df t is a maximal, consistent, present-tensed proposition that has been true, is true, or will be true.21
The present time is the one maximal, consistent, present-tensed
proposition that is true right now. (Just as the actual world is the
one maximal, consistent proposition that happens to be true.) The
time 10 years from now is the maximal, consistent, present-tensed
proposition that will be true 10 years from now. And similarly with
other past and future times. They are like possible worlds—they are
all logical constructs out of propositions.
Because times (like possible worlds) are logical constructs out of
propositions, they are not possible travel destinations. You cannot
travel to another possible world, because it is a logical construct,
rather than a concrete place. And you cannot travel to another time
for the same reason. Here then is the argument.
The No-Destination Argument
(1) The Dynamic Theory entails that other times are logical constructs rather than locations in a manifold.
(2) If other times are logical constructs rather than locations in
a manifold, then other times are not possible travel destinations.
(3) If other times are not possible travel destinations, then time
travel is not possible.
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel is not possible.
It should be pointed out that this argument (like The Rubber Duck
Argument) works equally well against the possibility of time travel
to the future. It is also worth noticing that there is a modal analogue
of The No-Destination Argument, with the conclusion that Modal
21

See for example Prior and Fine 1977, Markosian 2004: Section 3.10, and
Emery 2017.
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Actualism entails that modal travel is impossible. I would endorse
that argument, too, as would nearly every philosopher who is not a
modal realist. (While most modal realists, like David Lewis, would
argue that modal travel is impossible for other reasons. Modal travel
is not nearly as popular a concept as time travel.)
It is worth re-emphasizing that this argument depends crucially
on the sixth component that I have built into The Dynamic Theory
of time, namely, Presentism. So the argument will not apply to those
who endorse a view consisting of only the first five tenets of the view
that I am calling The Dynamic Theory. Notice also that the argument is distinct from an argument that one sometimes encounters,
according to which Presentism is inconsistent with the possibility
of time travel because it entails that the past and the future do not
exist.22 For according to what I have just said, past and future times
do exist—the problem, instead, is that they are not suitable travel
destinations.

8 A surprising corollary
There is a surprising corollary of the above arguments. If I am right
about any of these arguments, then The Dynamic Theory of Time
entails that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible. So
if we encounter people who seem to be time travelers from the future—people who show up with a strange but credible story about
how they come from the future (not to mention the monochromatic
outfits)—then we would have excellent empirical evidence against
The Dynamic Theory. This means that The Dynamic Theory of
Time, unlike many metaphysical theories, is empirically falsiiable.23

22

Keller and Nelson criticize such arguments in their 2001.

23
There is a slight complication here. I happen to be convinced, by anti-skeptical arguments like those found in Markosian 2014, that I do in fact know that
I am not a brain in a vat. But if I encountered apparent time travelers with a
plausible story, as described above, then I would probably not conclude that The
Dynamic Theory is false. Instead, I would probably conclude that I am a brain in
a vat after all (and I would tip my hat to my alien overlords for making the illusion
they are feeding me so interesting).
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9 Don’t push that button!
Suppose I am wrong about all of the above. Suppose personal time
(even on The Dynamic Theory) is sufficiently like external time to
make it deserve the name time. Suppose backward causation is possible (even on The Dynamic Theory). Suppose the fact that there is
only one next is somehow not enough (even on The Dynamic Theory)
to make it true that you can’t travel back in time. And suppose that
(even on The Dynamic Theory) other times somehow are possible
travel destinations. I think there is still a good reason why you should
not want to travel back in time, given The Dynamic Theory of Time.
In order to see why, return to our story of a woman who travels
back in time from 2020 to 1920. And consider two different contexts
in which you could be advising someone about what to choose. The
first context is an extra-world context, like the situation Atlanta finds
herself in in Plato’s Myth of Er, in Book X of The Republic. Atlanta, in
that situation, was choosing an entire life, all at once. (In the story,
Atlanta was able to view a bunch of different lives that were available
to her. The different lives were displayed on the ground in front of
her like little holograms. She ended up choosing the life of a great
athlete who—unlike herself in her previous life—was allowed to
participate in athletic competitions and win prizes and glory.) The
second context in which you could be advising someone is an intra-world context. In this kind of situation, you are offering advice to
someone about choosing how to continue the life that they are already living. (This is how we normally advise our friends.)
Now think about how we would advise our heroine from the time
travel scenario in an extra-world context. “Go for the time travel
world,” we would say to her. “That would be so much fun! You will
experience the same amount of life, altogether, but with your experiences in a weird order. Your personal time will disagree with
external time, but you will still have a full lifetime’s worth of experiences, and many of them will involve experiencing life as a time
traveler. It will be awesome!” (Keep in mind that we are here setting aside the previous four arguments against the possibility of time
travel to the past.)
And now think about how we would advise our heroine in an
intra-world context. Suppose that she has climbed into a machine
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that she built, with a dial set for 1920, and she is contemplating pushing the big red button. “What do you think I should do?” she asks
us. Our reply should be, “Stay alive, no matter what occurs!” For it
doesn’t matter (much) what happened 100 years ago. What matters
is what will happen next. (This point is closely related to The “Only
One Next” Argument.)
The reason for this difference in how we would advise our heroine in extra-world versus intra-world contexts is that when we are in
the middle of living our lives, we have a bias toward the future. We
also have biases toward the present, and toward the near future over
the distant future. These well-known time-biases are sensible, given
The Dynamic Theory of Time. (But maybe not so sensible on The
Static Theory.)24
And here is why all of this is relevant. When you are making
decisions, you are always in an intra-world context. You are always
deciding how to continue the life that you are already living. So as
you sit in the time machine (which we are no longer supposing to be
a misleadingly labeled annihilator), you are making an intra-world
decision, about what will happen to you next. And the best decision
for you, like the best decision for our heroine in an intra-world context, is not to go out of existence forever. (No matter what has happened in the past.) For here is what is true, on our suppositions, and
in the relevant situation: If you push the button, then that person in
the past (whose experiences do not now benefit you in any practical
way, since you have no memory of them) will have been you, and you
will be a time traveler, but you will now go out of existence forever.
And if you don’t push the button, then that person in the past will
not have been you (but will have been an amazing coincidence), you
will not be a time traveler, and you will continue to exist for a good
long time. My advice to you, in this situation, is what I suspect any
kind person would advise in such an intra-world context: Don’t push
that button!
Here is the argument suggested by these considerations.

24

On various problems relating to our time biases see Sullivan 2018.
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An Argument Against the Advisability of Traveling Back in Time
(1) The Dynamic Theory of Time entails that leaving the present to go back to the past involves permanently going out of
existence.
(2) Permanently going out of existence in order to ensure the
truth of some propositions about yourself in the past is not an
advisable tradeoff.
(3) If (1) and (2), then The Dynamic Theory entails that traveling back in time is not advisable.
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that traveling back in time is
not advisable.
This argument comes with three main caveats. The first is that, like
The No-Destination Argument (and unlike the first three arguments
I have given), it depends on including Presentism as a part of The
Dynamic Theory. The second caveat is that this argument does not
apply to all cases of time travel to the past. For if you have excellent
evidence that you will not be making a one-way trip to the past, but
will, for example, spend a month in 1920 and then return to the
present time (or even some time in the near future), then pushing the
button in the time machine will not (according to your evidence) lead
to your permanently going out of existence. (There may of course
be questions about whether the true account of personal identity for
human people like ourselves allows for periods of temporary non-existence, but let us set that issue aside.) So the above argument applies
only to cases of one-way time travel to the past. The third caveat is
that in some cases it is advisable to permanently go out of existence.
For if conditions in the world and in one’s life have become so bad
that one’s life is worse than non-existence, then all bets are off. But
if we assume that you are living a life that is worth living, and if we
assume we are talking about one-way time travel to the past, then
time travel to the past is clearly inadvisable on The Dynamic Theory.
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10 What are we thinking about when we think about time
travel to the past?
If what I have said above is correct, and if The Dynamic Theory of
Time is true, then there is something very puzzling going on when
we think about time travel to the past. For if The Dynamic Theory
is inconsistent with the possibility of this kind of time travel, and if
The Dynamic Theory is true, then such time travel is not metaphysically possible. This raises a question: What are we imagining when
we imagine time travel to the past? It certainly doesn’t feel like we
are imagining something impossible.
Here is the first part of my answer to this question. I think that
for many depictions of time travel in, for example, books and movies,
we are simply being told a story with flashbacks. What’s more, in the
story, the empirical details are just as the Static Theorist would like
them to be, in order to be a case of time travel. And the characters
in the story often accept that theirs is a genuine case of time travel.
But of course there is no way for the fiction really to depict things
as being a genuine case of time travel, whether time travel is possible
or not. A fiction cannot somehow depict that the metaphysical facts
are a certain way. So on my view, these are stories, told with flashbacks, of people who mistakenly think they are time travelers (or
mistakenly think they are dealing with time travelers), when they’re
really not.25
That’s fine, you might think, but what about the fact that we
can imagine ourselves traveling back in time? When you imagine a
time travel story in the first person, you are imagining a series of
events, seen from a first-person perspective: “First I am building
the time machine. Then I am setting the dials. Then I am pushing
the button in 2020 and, next, finding myself in the year 1920.”
And yet, if I am right, and if The Dynamic Theory is true, then
what seems like a perfectly possible series of experiences, imaginable by a six-year old, is in fact not possible after all. And yet it feels
possible. What’s up with that?
25
Bourne and Caddick Bourne offer a similar account of what is happening
when third-person fictions appear to portray certain kinds of time travel stories
that they take to be impossible (for reasons of their own). See their 2016: 129ff.
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The answer (and this is the second part of my response to the
general challenge about why we can effortlessly entertain time travel
stories, if what they depict is metaphysically impossible) is that when
you imagine such a series of experiences, you are not really imagining yourself being time a traveler. Instead, you are imagining pushing a button and then continuing to exist while everything around
you pops out of existence, and a whole bunch of things just like the
things that existed in 1920 pop into existence. And while all of this is
happening, reality keeps humming along, right through the shocking
disappearance of everything but you in 2020 and the simultaneous
appearance of a whole lot of 1920-looking things. This is of course a
pretty bizarre scenario, and probably not one that you actually want
to wish for, since it involves all of your friends and loved ones popping out of existence. But at least it is metaphysically possible, which
is why you can imagine it.

11 Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed two popular theories of time, each one
consisting of a package of specific theses that are related, but not
essentially tied together. These two theories are not the only theories of time, or even the only popular theories of time. (Although I
suspect that they happen to be the two most popular theories among
contemporary metaphysicians.) One of the two theories discussed
here—what I have called The Static Theory of Time—was considered mainly in order to contrast it with the theory that my arguments focused on, the view that I called The Dynamic Theory of
Time. So the fact that there are alternatives to The Static Theory, as
I have presented it here (that is, other packages that contain some but
not all of the specific components of the package I have identified),
does not have any bearing on the arguments of this paper.
But it is of course relevant that there are alternatives to The Dynamic Theory of Time, as I have presented it here, since my arguments have focused on that particular package of views. Still, the
only component of The Dynamic Theory, as it is presented here, that
anyone with Dynamic Theory sympathies is likely reject is the sixth
one, namely, Presentism. So it is worth pointing out that only two
of the five arguments offered in this paper—The No-Destination
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Argument and An Argument Against the Advisability of Traveling
Back in Time—depend on including Presentism in the package of
views that I have called The Dynamic Theory of Time. Which means
that the other three arguments presented in this paper—The Rubber Duck Argument, The No Backward causatioN Argument, and The
“Only One Next” Argument—will all apply to the other popular versions of The Dynamic Theory of Time. So if you believe that time is
significantly different from space, that physical objects do not have
temporal parts, that there are genuine and irreducible A-properties
(which cannot be correctly analyzed in terms of B-relations), that the
temporal facts about the world include ever-changing facts involving
A-properties, and that we must take tense seriously, then you should
believe that it is impossible to travel back in time. Moreover, if you
believe all of the components of what I have called The Dynamic
Theory of Time (including Presentism), but still think for some reason (despite all of my arguments) that it is possible to travel back in
time, then you should nevertheless not want to travel back in time. So
I end with the same advice that I gave above: Don’t push that button!26
Ned Markosian
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